A New Path to Nowhere: Jimmy Carter and Cuba
In the midst of the Cold War, President Jimmy Carter embarked on a path no president before him had: restarting diplomatic relations with Cuba. Intent on warming the Cold War further after detente under President Richard Nixon, he made the decision to normalize America’s relationship with the small island country. Fidel Castro had the same idea, and talks between American and Cuban diplomats were held throughout the following four years. Despite this optimistic shift in foreign policy, it soon ran into a series of obstacles, primarily Cuba’s military activities in Africa that effectively destroyed the momentum of negotiations. At the same time, Cuban demands for the United States to lift the embargo were met with a negative response. Both the U.S. and Cuba wanted full diplomatic relations, but the Cuban commitment to supporting African countries militarily and the United States’ refusal to lift the embargo unless Cuba would forgo such deployments was a bridge that neither would cross. This resulted in the breakdown of negotiations between the two countries that left little accomplished. Had either side been willing to be more flexible, it is possible that more significant progress up to full diplomatic relations could have been achieved.
Background
The relationship between the United States and Cuba is a complicated one to say the least. After the success of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 that saw Fidel Castro rise to power after overthrowing the reigning president and U.S. ally, Fulgencio Batista, President Dwight Eisenhower recognized the new government, but quickly decided to remove him from office. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy after him, wanted to keep Cuba in the U.S. sphere of influence, as it had been under Batista, and prevent a communist country from influencing Latin America. The infamous Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, a plan hatched by the Kennedy administration to overthrow the communist government involving U.S. trained Cuban exiles, was embarrassingly defeated by the Cubans and most were taken prisoner or killed. This and a multitude of assassination attempts on Castro himself marked a campaign of espionage and paramilitary activities by a U.S. intent on regime change (Gliejeses 2010, 328-329).
The culminating event of the hostilities was the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The impending nuclear catastrophe was resolved when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev removed nuclear missiles in Cuba and Kennedy removed nuclear weapons from Turkey. Castro was not consulted, and felt insulted. However, Cuba was and remained reliant on Soviet logistics and weaponry for defense and their activities in Africa, and they remained very much in the Soviet orbit (Gliejeses 2010, 330).
Between 1962 and 1974, the continual assassination attempts and embargo against Cuba constituted the status quo. What changed, though, was Cuba’s failures to support revolution in Latin America, resulting in slightly warmer relations with the U.S. In 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recognized that U.S. efforts against Cuba were no longer in the national interest, and took measures to facilitate a secret meeting in 1975 with the intention of developing better relations. This goal was not realized under the Ford administration, as Cuba came to the aid of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA, against two other rival factions supported by South Africa and the U.S (Gliejeses 2010, 335-337). Although some steps had been taken, such as the lifting of sanctions against firms that traded with Cuba, the extradition of a hijacker, and the lifting of aid restrictions, Ford subsequently stopped the negotiations and the dream of better relations died (Pastor 2012, 239). That is, until 1977. Enter Jimmy Carter.
Elected in 1976, Carter was atypical for a Cold War president. Intent on capitalizing on the detente that he inherited from Nixon and Ford, he desired to “promote global community” and prioritized “human rights and democracy, normalization and the improvement of relations, arms control, the resolution of conflict in the Middle East, conflict resolution in Africa, Third World development, and the health of the global economy” (Rosati 1987, 44). About normalizing relations, he asked, “should we start the process of giving them an option to be both our friends and the friends of others, hoping that they will come to a more democratic free society and joining with us in making a better world?” (Rosati 1987, 47). For him, the answer was an emphatic “yes.”
Argument
Jimmy Carter and Fidel Castro wanted to achieve full diplomatic relations between their two countries, and there is strong evidence that they would have, had they been more willing to compromise. The primary factor that ended the hope of accomplishing this was the increased Cuban military presence in Africa and the American position that made lifting the embargo conditional on a drawdown of Cuban forces in Africa. Before this can be discussed further, a summary of the events leading to this rupture is required.
Within one month of Carter’s inauguration, a CIA report found that Cuba was willing to begin negotiations to achieve full diplomatic relations. The Cubans wanted to discuss renegotiating an antihijacking agreement, the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, U.S. prisoners held by Cuba, and economic sanctions. They desired to live peacefully alongside the U.S., and wanted to start as soon as possible while the window of opportunity was still open (CIA Intelligence Cable 1977). Just after this, Carter was interviewed by Walter Cronkite, where he remarked that he wanted to bridge the gap with Cuba (Pastor 2012, 240). This became official not much later in NSC 6 on March 15, 1977. Here Carter formally established his foreign policy towards Cuba:
“I have concluded that we should attempt to achieve normalization of relations with Cuba. To this end, we should begin direct and confidential talks in a measured and careful fashion with representatives of the government of Cuba. Our objective is to set in motion a process which will lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations…which will advance the interests of the United States with respect to combating terrorism; human rights; Cuba’s foreign intervention; compensation for American expropriated property; and reduction of Cuban relations (political and military) with the Soviet Union” (Presidential Directive/NSC 6 1977).
Soon after this, Senators James Abourezk and George McGovern met with Castro in Havana to discuss some of these issues. The key takeaway was Castro’s demand that the embargo must be at least partially lifted as a precondition to negotiations (President’s Meeting with Senators James Abourezk and George McGovern 1977). Both Cuba and the U.S. agreed to meet and discuss various issues. The smaller of these issues consisted of fishing zones, immigration, and prisoner releases, whereas Africa and the embargo proved much more difficult to negotiate. The first of these meetings was on March 24, 1977 (LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015, 161). These meetings started off well, and both countries made unilateral goodwill measures to smooth over the talks, with no expectation of reciprocity. These included halting SR-71 flights over Cuba and not renewing a travel ban by the U.S., and Cuba allowed the U.S. Coast Guard to use its water and airspace (LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015, 157; Pastor 2012, 247). Another important development was the creation of Interest Sections, which dealt with the issues mentioned earlier and would act as a forum for discussion, in September 1977 (Policy Review Committee Meeting 1977). Though diplomatic relations were not foreseeable in the immediate future and the African and embargo issues were not resolved, progress was made and an understanding between the two sides was developed. For the most part, everything was going well until events in Africa took off.
In 1977, Somalia invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. While initial requests for Cuban troops were denied, Castro agreed to provide soldiers a few months later (Gliejeses 2010, 338-339). This angered Carter, who since the beginning had made it clear that he wanted Cuba to stop militarily intervening in Africa. Castro defended the decision to help defend Ethiopia because Somalia was the aggressor and ignored the territorial integrity of the border (Pastor 2012, 248). Another incident, known as Shaba II, took place shortly after Ethiopia when Katangan forces invaded Zaire, now called the Democratic Republic of the Congo, from Angola. Unlike the previous iteration of such an invasion, where both the U.S. and Cuba were surprised and handled it delicately, the U.S. attacked Cuba, accusing them of training the militants. The Cubans shot back at the lies, and the war of words began (LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015, 168-173). Whilst events in central and eastern Africa played out, the Cubans were still in Angola, albeit the Angolans needed them to survive and Cuba would not negotiate its activities there. This was made clear to the U.S. during talks (Gliejeses 2013, 100; LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015, 163).
As if relations could not worsen, they did during the Soviet brigade crisis. The Carter administration identified a Soviet unit in Cuba, but failed to notice that they had been there as a part of the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Due to Carter ending surveillance flights over Cuba, it was forgotten by the U.S. Domestic critics rose up against Carter, and another war of words commenced. In conclusion, it served as a major embarrassment for the Carter administration and another blunder in the Cuban-American relationship (LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015, 207-211).
None of this bode well for negotiations, and signaled the end of progress. Carter, years later, remarked that Ethiopia was the turning point (Interview with Jimmy Carter on Cuba 2004), and “the momentum of normalization was lost” (LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015, 223). To put it succinctly, “relations never recovered” (Pastor 2012, 249). Though meetings between Cuba and the U.S. continued, any “hope of reenergizing the normalization process” was effectively dead (LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015. 173). After a meeting with the Cubans, Carter was informed that because the U.S. had linked lifting the embargo to Cuba ceasing its military deployments to Africa, progress was stalled. During the meeting, the Cubans reiterated their position that they would not negotiate about Africa, and went further to state that they “play an important role in Africa, and if that means they will have to live with the embargo, they are reconciled to it (Zbigniew Brzezinski 1978). A subsequent meeting resulted in the same response: Cuba would not compromise on Africa, which the U.S. diplomats who were present quipped the talks were at “a dead-end in terms of resolving problems” (Pastor and Tarnoff 1980). In general, “US-Cuban relations deteriorated further in the remaining two years of the Carter administration…by the time Carter stepped down, relations with Cuba were no better than they had been in Ford’s last year” (Gliejeses 2010, 339-340).
The Cubans held the same opinion, that neither side would budge. A senior Cuban official, Jose Padron, who participated in several of the meetings, was just as skeptical as some of the American officials, particularly National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Padron “wondered whether the USG [United States Government] was buying time [referring to the multiple rounds of meetings] or was not interested in real progress or saw no hope of reaching a significant understanding with the Cuban Government” (LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015, 190). In a later meeting, Padron stated, in response to a failed attempt to raise the embargo issue:
“We have not dealt with the blockade, and it is our impression that you are avoiding the issue…For us it it totally unacceptable for the United States to ask for a constructive and positive position from us on problems vital to its interests, and for it to not respond at all with any constructive gesture on the points Cuba considers vital” (LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015, 191-192).
Padron continued this rhetoric, accusing the U.S. of trying to meddle in Cuban affairs and ultimately said that “I do not see the possibility of much progress towards substantive agreements with the United States” (LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015, 193). It was after this meeting that Carter decided to not plan any more meetings with the Cubans (LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015, 194).
At this point, Cuba and the U.S. both attempted to ease the tensions. At a meeting between a nongovernment official, the CEO of Coca-Cola, and Castro, both countries made goodwill gestures. Carter announced that he intended to improve relations upon reelection, and Castro agreed to take unilateral actions by releasing some American prisoners (Muskie 1980). The situation seemed to lighten when Castro shifted his position to be more accommodating of U.S. concerns: he supported the idea of cooperating with the U.S. to “foster diplomatic solutions in Africa,” and “indicated more Cuban flexibility” (LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015, 199). Both sides reiterated their goals of full diplomatic relations, but this soon fell apart after a meeting between Robert Pastor, a midlevel NSC diplomat, and Castro. This marked the end for the negotiations (LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015, 199-203).
Why did these talks fail? They failed because the U.S. was not willing to give up their biggest bargaining chip, the embargo, and Cuba was not willing to stop supporting African states who asked for their assistance. It could be argued that the efforts to renew relations were destined to fail from the start. This is a plausible argument, but it assumes that neither side was seriously willing to negotiate. The lengths both governments went to discuss issues with each other is indicative of an interest of some kind of mutual benefit. Furthermore, even after the events in Angola, Zaire, and Ethiopia tore a rift between Cuba and America, they both maintained the Interest Sections and continued the diplomacy by demonstrating, unilaterally, their resolve to keep the dialogue going.
Conclusion
The efforts to reach full diplomatic relations between Cuba and the U.S. could be labeled as a missed opportunity. Perhaps the timing was wrong, or that the actors involved complicated the situation more than it had to be. For Castro, he “viewed his international role as more important than normalizing relations” (Pastor 2012, 257). In his zeal for spreading and supporting revolution abroad, Castro was described as “engaged in a great crusade” (Gliejeses 2010, 341). Regarding Carter, he was under enormous pressure to stand up to the Soviet Union, and Cuba as well. After Cuban forays into Ethiopia, and especially after the Iran hostage crisis, he struggled to cultivate, let alone maintain the image of a strong president, which he did not have a reputation for. This clashed with his efforts to unite the global community, and he succumbed to the pressure, as evidenced by his refusal to lift the embargo, among other things (Mitchell 2016, 444-446). Further complicating things, Carter was also torn between his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, and National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, as the former held a more positive outlook and interpreted the world from the perspective of liberalism, while the latter was more pessimistic, a realist, and a hawk on the Soviet Union and its allies (Rosati 1987, 69-75). There were moments where cooperation seemed possible, but just out of reach, and there were snippets of conversation that “hinted at some flexibility compared to the more rigid public positions of the two sides, but they were roads not taken” (LeoGrande and Kornbluh 2015, 203). Although negotiations started off relatively smoothly, Cuban military support for Ethiopia, and the everpresent U.S. refusal to unilaterally remove the embargo, were the catalyst that started the end of the progress towards full diplomatic negotiations. Despite this unceremonious end, the Interest Sections remained open past Carter’s presidency, prisoner releases from both sides were facilitated, and both countries cooperated on immigration, drug trafficking, and environmental issues (Pastor 2012, 257-258). In conclusion, though unsuccessful in achieving the stated diplomatic goal, some progress was made towards bridging the gap between Cuba and the U.S.
By Zach Maddux
Bibliography:
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Centre Image Credits:
By FOTO:FORTEPAN / Urbán Tamás, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=51179730 - (No Adaptations Made