Pax Romana: How Scipio cemented Rome’s destiny at Zama
Historians often reference the inception of “Pax Romana”, or the “Roman Peace”, as 27 BC; however, was this the case?. Although the end of the civil war between Octavian (better known as Augustus) and Mark Antony is commonly cited as the starting date for this “Roman Peace”, Roman domination can be seen to have started as early as 202 BC as argued by Historian Michael J.Taylor (Taylor, 2019: 310), following Scipio’s victory at the Battle of Zama. This event marked Rome as destined to be a superpower of the ancient world, as there was no other nation or empire that could pose a threat to Roman Expansion like the Carthaginians did.
While touching on the Second Punic War only briefly, this essay will focus on the Battle of Zama. The Second Punic War was incited by various factors. One obvious answer was the humiliating Treaty of Lutatius that ended the First Punic War, in which Carthage was made to pay Rome 3,200 talents of silver and to relinquish the Mediterranean islands of Corsica, Sardinia and parts of Sicily (Lazenby, 1996: 58). This led to a deep hatred within the Carthaginians, highlighted by Hannibal Barca, who himself can be seen as an essential causation for the Second Punic War in 219 BC, after sacking Rome’s Iberian city-state ally Saguntum (Collins, 1998: 13). After this, Hannibal led a successful campaign over the Alps into the Italian Peninsula. His military genius is most remembered for his victory at Cannae, where estimates of Roman losses vary between 10,500 and 70,000, with Roman Historian Livy suggesting that 45,000 Romans were killed (Livy, 1828: 22,49).
By 216 BC, the Roman Republic was under real threat of extinction; however, despite this, it still refused to surrender. The war would last another sixteen years after “Cannae”, as Rome continued to fight successfully on other fronts, most notably in Iberia (modern Spain), where a young and rising Scipio, whose father also fought and died in the Second Punic War (Hoyos, 2015: 169), took New Carthage in 209 BC around the age of twenty-seven, ending Carthaginian rule in Iberia (Zimmerman, 2015: 292). By 204 BC, with Hannibal Barca tied down in southern Italy, Scipio landed in North Africa with a volunteer army and defeated the Carthaginian army at the Battle of Utica in 203 BC, which led to proposed peace talks to end the war (Lazenby, 1998: 293). Peace talks failed after Carthage recalled Hannibal to North Africa to face Scipio directly (Carey, 2007: 111). In 202 BC, Hannibal consolidated his forces at Hadrumetum. (Goldsworthy, 2006: 244). The Carthaginian senate repeatedly ordered Hannibal to advance and defeat Scipio. Despite these orders, Hannibal was cautious to advance due to the lack of effective cavalry in his army (Lazenby, 1998: 216). Hannibal advanced when he believed his army was not only as strong as it would get, but also predicted that the Roman auxiliary force had not joined with the bulk of the Roman army (Lazenby, 1998: 313) and met the Roman army near the town of Zama.
Roman and Carthaginian troop deployment. By Mohammad Adil – CC BY-SA 3.0
The image above shows how both Scipio and Hannibal deployed their troops at Zama. Scipio had command of roughly 30,000 men, including 6,000 infantry from their Numidian allies, with the Numidian King also supplying 4,000 cavalry placed on the Roman flanks (Miles, 2011: 316). These superior cavalry were perfect for the flat plains, a tactic Hannibal was familiar with and had used effectively during his time in the Italian peninsula. Hannibal also had 2,000 Numidian cavalry, but it was at a clear disadvantage in this regard, being half the number of the Numidian King. (Carey, 2007: 115). He did have a clear infantry advantage over the Romans, fielding between 40,000 and 50,000 men (Goldsworthy, 2006: 302) in tandem with the infamous war elephants used in an attempt to smash Roman lines positioned at the front of the Carthaginian lines.
Hannibal moved first on the field, sending his war elephants forward; however, Scipio, likely anticipating this move, wisely created a plan to combat this threat. As the elephants slowly approached, Scipio gave the order for his lines to separate, creating many gaps. Instead of smashing the Roman line, the elephants simply walked through the channels created by Scipio’s manoeuvre (Taylor, 2019: 321). Even worse for Hannibal, not only had his elephants not created the desired damage, but some got scared, turned and smashed into the Carthaginian cavalry on the wings. The Numidian cavalry on the Roman side saw an opportunity and launched an attack on their opposition (Taylor, 2019: 321). Scipio’s cavalry, gaining the upper hand, pursued the Carthaginian cavalry as they fled from the battlefield.
After the two cavalry forces left the battlefield, it was infantry versus infantry. Hannibal had cleverly positioned his force with the weakest at the front and the strong core of veterans that had been with him in the Italian Peninsula as the final rank the Romans had to face (Lazenby, 1998: 222). Although the Roman infantry was smaller in number, they managed to fight through the first two ranks and come to face Hannibal’s strongest and final rank.
At this point, the position was dire for both Hannibal and Scipio. The Roman men were likely exhausted and high in casualties (Goldsworth, 2006: 306-7). Hannibal likely knew the threat the Numidian cavalry allied with Rome would pose to his army if they broke their pursuit and returned to the battlefield. Nevertheless, the two infantries faced off in a bitter fight as ancient Greek historian Polybius put it “with the greatest fire and fury” (Bagnall, 1999: 294). However, the deciding moment would fall to Scipio as Hannibal’s worst fear became reality and the cavalry charged into the Carthaginian rear, destroying his army and any chance of victory (Goldsworthy, 2006: 307).
Scipio’s decisive victory over Hannibal at Zama forced Carthage to sign a peace with Rome that utterly destroyed them further (Carey, 2007: 132). Rome had fought off the greatest crisis that it had ever seen, following near annihilation as a city due to Hannibal’s genius in the Italian Peninsula. This victory secured Roman control over the western Mediterranean and complete domination over the great Carthaginian Empire, and it would not be for another 500 years that Rome itself would come under a threat from a foreign power of being wiped off the map. As Taylor argued that Rome’s victory at Zama “laid the foundation for six centuries of Roman hegemony over the Western Mediterranean” (Taylor, 2019: 310) signified the beginning of “Pax Romana”, particularly in the Western Mediterranean and Rome would not fight a war so deadly against a foreign power for five-centuries conquering all the lands surrounding the Eastern Mediterranean becoming one of the most influential empires of history.
Bibliography:
Bagnall, Nigel, The Punic Wars, Rome, Carthage and the Struggle for the Mediterranean, London: Pimlico, 1999.
Carey, Brian, Hannibal’s Last Battle: Zama & the Fall of Carthage. Barnslet, South Yorkshire: Pen & Word, 2007.
Collins, Roger, Spain: An Oxford Archaeological Guide. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Goldsworthy, Adrian, The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265–146 BC. London: Phoenix, 2006.
Hoyos, Dexter, Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War. Oxford University Press, 2015.
Lazenby, John, The First Punic War: A Military History. Stanford University Press, 1996.
Lazenby, John, Hannibal’s War: A Military History of the Second Punic War. Warminster, Wiltshire: Aris & Phillips, 1998.
Livy, The History of Rome, J. & J. Harper, New York, 1828.
Miles, Richard, Carthage Must be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilization. London: Penguin, 2011.
Taylor, Michael J, Reconstructing the Battle of Zama. The Classical Journal 114(3), https://doi.org/10.5184/classicalj.114.3.0310, 2019.
Zimmermann, Klaus, “Roman Strategy and Aims in the Second Punic War”. In Hoyos, Dexter (ed.). A Companion to the Punic Wars. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2015.